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Citizen	 ﾠContention	 ﾠand	 ﾠCampus	 ﾠCalm:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠParadox	 ﾠof	 ﾠCivil	 ﾠSociety	 ﾠin	 ﾠPost-ﾭ‐Tiananmen	 ﾠChina	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ




Civil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠChina	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠperplexing	 ﾠparadox.	 ﾠDespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbrutal	 ﾠ
suppression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1989	 ﾠTiananmen	 ﾠUprising,	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcontention	 ﾠand	 ﾠassociational	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠ
swelled	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠensuing	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠmight	 ﾠhave	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠruthless	 ﾠJune	 ﾠFourth	 ﾠrepression	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmassive	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdeterred	 ﾠsubsequent	 ﾠcontestation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
frequency	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsteadily	 ﾠescalated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠtwenty-ﾭ‐five	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠChina	 ﾠ
today	 ﾠis	 ﾠhost	 ﾠto	 ﾠcountless	 ﾠgrassroots	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠgovernment-ﾭ‐sponsored)	 ﾠNGOs,	 ﾠfoundations,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcharities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠmention	 ﾠa	 ﾠvibrant	 ﾠsphere	 ﾠof	 ﾠonline	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠdebate;	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1989,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
nascent	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠexist.	 ﾠNowhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocietal	 ﾠ
engagement	 ﾠmore	 ﾠevident	 ﾠthan	 ﾠamong	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠstudents.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠfew	 ﾠsigns	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠstudent-ﾭ‐led	 ﾠ“democracy	 ﾠmovement”	 ﾠlooming	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhorizon.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠ
campuses	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPeople’s	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdays	 ﾠform	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
apparently	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠweb	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠand	 ﾠstability	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextant	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠscope	 ﾠand	 ﾠspread	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠin	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐1989	 ﾠChina	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠimpressive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ1990s	 ﾠ
witnessed	 ﾠa	 ﾠwave	 ﾠof	 ﾠviolent	 ﾠtax	 ﾠriots	 ﾠby	 ﾠfarmers	 ﾠcomplaining	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“unfair	 ﾠburdens.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
central	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠresponded	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrural	 ﾠunrest	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠhistoric	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠto	 ﾠabolish	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠ
centuries-ﾭ‐old	 ﾠagricultural	 ﾠtax,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠshifted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountryside	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1990s	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivatization	 ﾠand	 ﾠbankruptcy	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠstate	 ﾠenterprises	 ﾠprompted	 ﾠ
laid-ﾭ‐off	 ﾠand	 ﾠretired	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠto	 ﾠlodge	 ﾠpetitions	 ﾠand	 ﾠstage	 ﾠsit-ﾭ‐ins	 ﾠat	 ﾠfactories	 ﾠand	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
offices	 ﾠin	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠplant	 ﾠclosures	 ﾠand	 ﾠpaltry	 ﾠpensions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2000s,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠside-ﾭ‐
effects	 ﾠof	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠreform	 ﾠbecame	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠvisible,	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠpollution	 ﾠsparked	 ﾠ
“not-ﾭ‐in-ﾭ‐my-ﾭ‐backyard”	 ﾠrallies	 ﾠamong	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠanxious	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠits	 ﾠnewly	 ﾠ
acquired	 ﾠproperty	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠhealth.	 ﾠState-ﾭ‐sanctioned	 ﾠinfrastructure	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠ
real	 ﾠestate	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠignited	 ﾠangry	 ﾠremonstrations	 ﾠby	 ﾠdisplaced	 ﾠresidents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLabor	 ﾠdisputes	 ﾠ
erupted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwages	 ﾠand	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠworking	 ﾠconditions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMigrant	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠ
demanded	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpermitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠsit	 ﾠfor	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠentrance	 ﾠexaminations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
cities	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠparents	 ﾠlabored.	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠyet,	 ﾠamidst	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexplosion	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠby	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
seemingly	 ﾠall	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠaggrieved	 ﾠcitizens,	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠcampuses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠremained	 ﾠ
remarkably	 ﾠquiet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
THREAT	 ﾠAVERTED	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Averting	 ﾠcampus	 ﾠunrest	 ﾠin	 ﾠChina	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠmean	 ﾠfeat.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOver	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwentieth	 ﾠcentury,	 ﾠ
every	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠa	 ﾠcatalytic	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcycle	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠ
movements	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtransformed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtrajectory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠ
Party	 ﾠ(CCP)	 ﾠtraces	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠorigins	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMay	 ﾠFourth	 ﾠMovement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1919,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠnationalistic	 ﾠ
students	 ﾠstreamed	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠcampuses	 ﾠonto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstreets	 ﾠto	 ﾠdenounce	 ﾠJapan’s	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠsovereignty.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠyears	 ﾠlater,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠband	 ﾠof	 ﾠintellectuals	 ﾠ–	 ﾠled	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDean	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Librarian	 ﾠof	 ﾠPeking	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfounded	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCCP	 ﾠto	 ﾠspearhead	 ﾠa	 ﾠrevolution	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠrestore	 ﾠ
China’s	 ﾠnational	 ﾠpride.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1930s	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1940s,	 ﾠthousands	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠsuspended	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
studies	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠrevolution	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠfront	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwar	 ﾠ
against	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠ(1937-ﾭ‐45)	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCivil	 ﾠWar	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNationalist	 ﾠParty	 ﾠ(1945-ﾭ‐49).	 ﾠ	 ﾠJust	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
few	 ﾠyears	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPeople’s	 ﾠRepublic	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina	 ﾠ(PRC)	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1949,	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠ
rallied	 ﾠto	 ﾠChairman	 ﾠMao’s	 ﾠinjunction	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“let	 ﾠa	 ﾠhundred	 ﾠflowers	 ﾠbloom”	 ﾠby	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠspirited	 ﾠ
criticisms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠsocialist	 ﾠsystem;	 ﾠshocked	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdepth	 ﾠof	 ﾠdissent,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠleadership	 ﾠ
unleashed	 ﾠa	 ﾠdraconian	 ﾠ“Anti-ﾭ‐rightist	 ﾠCampaign”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsummer	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1957.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠlater,	 ﾠ
campus	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠagain	 ﾠaugured	 ﾠradical	 ﾠchange	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠChairman	 ﾠMao	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠupon	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠRed	 ﾠ
Guards	 ﾠto	 ﾠjumpstart	 ﾠhis	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠProletarian	 ﾠCultural	 ﾠRevolution.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ1966,	 ﾠBeijing’s	 ﾠleading	 ﾠ
universities	 ﾠserved	 ﾠas	 ﾠlaunching	 ﾠpads	 ﾠfor	 ﾠMao’s	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠrevolutionary	 ﾠquest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠCultural	 ﾠRevolution	 ﾠdecade	 ﾠ(1966-ﾭ‐76),	 ﾠmass	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“class	 ﾠstruggle”	 ﾠsupplanted	 ﾠ
classroom	 ﾠinstruction	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠcampus	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTiananmen	 ﾠUprising	 ﾠerupted	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
thirteen	 ﾠyears	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCultural	 ﾠRevolution,	 ﾠit	 ﾠlooked	 ﾠas	 ﾠthough	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠ
university	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠonce	 ﾠagain	 ﾠpoised	 ﾠto	 ﾠspark	 ﾠa	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠtransformation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠbloody	 ﾠsuppression	 ﾠof	 ﾠJune	 ﾠFourth	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠstymied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcall	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
reform	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠmillions	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotesters;	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠstemmed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenerational	 ﾠtide	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠ
influential	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠpunctuated	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠentire	 ﾠtwentieth	 ﾠcentury.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
twenty-ﾭ‐five	 ﾠyears	 ﾠnow,	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcampuses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠremained	 ﾠuncharacteristically	 ﾠtranquil.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
anomaly	 ﾠappears	 ﾠeven	 ﾠstarker	 ﾠin	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcascade	 ﾠof	 ﾠmomentous	 ﾠevents,	 ﾠinvigorated	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
always	 ﾠinstigated	 ﾠby	 ﾠrestive	 ﾠstudents,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠelsewhere	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠduring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
period:	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope’s	 ﾠRevolutions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1989,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠColor	 ﾠRevolutions,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠArab	 ﾠSpring	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠaftermath	 ﾠof	 ﾠJune	 ﾠFourth,	 ﾠjournalistic	 ﾠand	 ﾠscholarly	 ﾠconsensus	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWest	 ﾠ
ascribed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisappointing	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠ1989	 ﾠTiananmen	 ﾠUprising	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
stunning	 ﾠsuccess	 ﾠof	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐Communist	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠacross	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠlater	 ﾠthat	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relative	 ﾠweakness	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠPoland’s	 ﾠSolidary,	 ﾠCzechoslovakia’s	 ﾠ
Charter	 ﾠ77,	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary’s	 ﾠDanube	 ﾠCircle	 ﾠwere	 ﾠapplauded	 ﾠas	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠemerging	 ﾠurban	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
society	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠrise	 ﾠhad	 ﾠspelled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemise	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠBucharest	 ﾠto	 ﾠBudapest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠautonomous	 ﾠassociational	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Beijing	 ﾠwas	 ﾠblamed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdurability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC’s	 ﾠauthoritarian	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTiananmen	 ﾠUprising	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠurban	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠpresumed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠprerequisite	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
democratization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ“democracy	 ﾠsalons”	 ﾠhad	 ﾠsprouted	 ﾠup	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Chinese	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠcampuses	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1980s,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠwere	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠand	 ﾠnebulous	 ﾠentities,	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠ
monitored	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠapparatus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmillions	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotesters	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmarched	 ﾠin	 ﾠBeijing	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠother	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcities	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspring	 ﾠof	 ﾠ1989	 ﾠwere	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpart	 ﾠmobilized	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠassociations,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠvia	 ﾠpre-ﾭ‐existing	 ﾠsocialist	 ﾠinstitutions:	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
universities,	 ﾠstate-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠenterprises,	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠmass	 ﾠassociations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
party	 ﾠagencies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠleaders	 ﾠfinally	 ﾠissued	 ﾠan	 ﾠunambiguous	 ﾠdirective	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemobilize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
movement,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠfell	 ﾠinto	 ﾠline	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠcrumbled	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠovernight.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Tracing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfailure	 ﾠof	 ﾠTiananmen	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠweakness	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠheightens	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparadox	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐1989	 ﾠdevelopments,	 ﾠhowever.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠquarter	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠseen	 ﾠa	 ﾠtorrent	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtually	 ﾠall	 ﾠcorners	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠacademia;	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠalso	 ﾠwitnessed	 ﾠan	 ﾠunprecedented	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠvolunteerism	 ﾠand	 ﾠNGO	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠ–	 ﾠor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fledgling	 ﾠ“civil	 ﾠsociety”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠpronounced	 ﾠon	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠcampuses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠStudents	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
professors	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforefront	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠextraordinary	 ﾠsurge	 ﾠin	 ﾠassociational	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
community	 ﾠservice.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdeepening	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparadox	 ﾠof	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐’49	 ﾠtrends,	 ﾠapplications	 ﾠto	 ﾠjoin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠParty	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠall-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠamong	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
instructors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠContrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠpredictions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠand	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠChina	 ﾠseems	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconducive	 ﾠto	 ﾠauthoritarianism	 ﾠresilience	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠimminent	 ﾠ
democratization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC’s	 ﾠanomalous	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠacademics.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠcomplicity	 ﾠare	 ﾠmultiple.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarray	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠdeploys	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠorder	 ﾠon	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠcampuses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
subtle	 ﾠtechniques	 ﾠof	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠallegiance	 ﾠand	 ﾠregime	 ﾠ
loyalty	 ﾠamong	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠand	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThird,	 ﾠand	 ﾠarguably	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ
important,	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregime-ﾭ‐supportive	 ﾠcivic	 ﾠengagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ
afforded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIronically,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠassociational	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfound	 ﾠamong	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderpin,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠundermine,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠirony	 ﾠis	 ﾠunderscored	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
term	 ﾠ“civil	 ﾠsociety”	 ﾠ(gongmin	 ﾠshehui)	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠseven	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠ(along	 ﾠwith	 ﾠuniversal	 ﾠvalues,	 ﾠ
freedom	 ﾠof	 ﾠspeech,	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠcrony	 ﾠcapitalism,	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠindependence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠof	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠParty)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠregime	 ﾠhas	 ﾠofficially	 ﾠbanned	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
discourse	 ﾠon	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠ“dangerous	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠinfluences.”	 ﾠ
CAMPUS	 ﾠCONTROLS	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmechanisms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAcutely	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠcampus	 ﾠ
turmoil,	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠa	 ﾠbattery	 ﾠof	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠto	 ﾠmonitor	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
restrain	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCollege	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠare	 ﾠorganized	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“homeroom”	 ﾠ(banji)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
class	 ﾠyear	 ﾠ(nianji),	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthese	 ﾠunits	 ﾠheaded	 ﾠby	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠreliable	 ﾠpeers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠconvey	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠadministration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPeer	 ﾠsurveillance	 ﾠand	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠis	 ﾠembedded	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠa	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠoversight	 ﾠhierarchy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmainstay	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠregimen	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠup	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
so-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ“guidance	 ﾠcounselors”	 ﾠ(fudaoyuan),	 ﾠtrained	 ﾠpersonnel	 ﾠtasked	 ﾠwith	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠclose	 ﾠtabs	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠcharges	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠviolate	 ﾠapproved	 ﾠ
boundaries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠcounselors	 ﾠwas	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠat	 ﾠTsinghua	 ﾠ
University	 ﾠas	 ﾠearly	 ﾠas	 ﾠ1953,	 ﾠit	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠrenewed	 ﾠand	 ﾠenlarged	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ1989.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcounselors’	 ﾠduties	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠresident	 ﾠtutors	 ﾠon	 ﾠmany	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠ
campuses:	 ﾠhelping	 ﾠto	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠproblems,	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠadvice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ
serving	 ﾠas	 ﾠolder	 ﾠrole	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpuerile	 ﾠundergraduates.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnlike	 ﾠresident	 ﾠtutors	 ﾠat	 ﾠOxford	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
Harvard,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchief	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfudaoyuan	 ﾠis	 ﾠideological	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Typically	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠinstructors	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠlate	 ﾠtwenties	 ﾠor	 ﾠearly	 ﾠthirties,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠcounselors	 ﾠ
(assisted	 ﾠby	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠinformants)	 ﾠreport	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeputy	 ﾠparty	 ﾠsecretaries	 ﾠresponsible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
student	 ﾠwork	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstructure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmethods	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ“modernized”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaid	 ﾠof	 ﾠnew	 ﾠtechniques	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠtechnologies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠmental	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠa	 ﾠstaple	 ﾠ
feature	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠcampuses.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“mental	 ﾠillness”	 ﾠis	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠ
construed	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠideas	 ﾠand	 ﾠinclinations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠdeems	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠdangerous,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠof	 ﾠmandatory	 ﾠmental	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠscreening	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfreshmen	 ﾠare	 ﾠforwarded	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcadres	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
analysis	 ﾠand	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠpreventative	 ﾠor	 ﾠpunitive	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnother	 ﾠ“modernized”	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠgauging	 ﾠ
(and	 ﾠguiding)	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠis	 ﾠafforded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspread	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinternet	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠmedia.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
2008	 ﾠChina	 ﾠpassed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld’s	 ﾠbiggest	 ﾠinternet	 ﾠuser,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐blogging	 ﾠvia	 ﾠWeibo	 ﾠ
(the	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠof	 ﾠTwitter)	 ﾠand	 ﾠmessaging	 ﾠvia	 ﾠWeChat	 ﾠ(an	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠto	 ﾠFacebook)	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠamong	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠstudents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠBlog	 ﾠpostings,	 ﾠtext	 ﾠmessages,	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠcellular	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠelectronic	 ﾠcommunications	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(both	 ﾠvirtual	 ﾠand	 ﾠactual)	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstudents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠenable	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠto	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠmonitor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
burgeoning	 ﾠactivism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCounselors	 ﾠand	 ﾠcadres	 ﾠcombat	 ﾠsubversive	 ﾠor	 ﾠsuspicious	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠcensorship,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠby	 ﾠcommissioning	 ﾠcounter-ﾭ‐posts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpromote	 ﾠthe	 ﾠofficially	 ﾠ
prescribed	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠdeploys	 ﾠproactive	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠreactive	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠ
sentiment	 ﾠin	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCCP’s	 ﾠagenda.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1990s,	 ﾠideological	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠ(sixiang	 ﾠzhengzhi	 ﾠjiaoyu)	 ﾠand	 ﾠmilitary	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠ(junxun)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
components	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠcurriculum.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠand	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠare	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠinculcate	 ﾠ
regime-ﾭ‐supportive	 ﾠdispositions	 ﾠand	 ﾠdeportment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOf	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠinstruction	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“cultural	 ﾠproficiency”	 ﾠ(wenhua	 ﾠsuzhi)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“national	 ﾠcharacter”	 ﾠ(guoqing),	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠart,	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠand	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpostulate	 ﾠan	 ﾠorganic	 ﾠ
connection	 ﾠand	 ﾠessential	 ﾠcompatibility	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsplendors	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠancient	 ﾠ“tradition”	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠits	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠ“socialist”	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠextension	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPatriotic	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠ
Campaign,	 ﾠlaunched	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaftermath	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTiananmen	 ﾠUprising,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhighlighted	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
China’s	 ﾠnational	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠheritage	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠrevolutionary	 ﾠexperience	 ﾠas	 ﾠtwin	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
legitimacy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠParty.	 ﾠCultural	 ﾠproficiency	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenerous	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCentral	 ﾠPropaganda	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠpromoted	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclassroom,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
theaters,	 ﾠmuseums,	 ﾠfield	 ﾠtrips	 ﾠto	 ﾠancient	 ﾠand	 ﾠrevolutionary	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠsites,	 ﾠinvited	 ﾠlectures	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
distinguished	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠintellectuals,	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠprojects	 ﾠby	 ﾠrenowned	 ﾠteams	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
scientists	 ﾠand	 ﾠhumanists,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠforth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠuniversities	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠa	 ﾠkey	 ﾠnode	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmassive	 ﾠ
party-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠinitiative	 ﾠin	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠconvince	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠthat	 ﾠCCP	 ﾠrule	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
endowed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ“Chinese	 ﾠcharacteristics”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrender	 ﾠits	 ﾠauthority	 ﾠboth	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠand	 ﾠnecessary.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠovert	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠand	 ﾠformal	 ﾠideological	 ﾠinstruction	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠcause	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
complaint	 ﾠamong	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstudents,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsubtle	 ﾠand	 ﾠsophisticated	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
cultural	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠsuccess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠone	 ﾠhears	 ﾠmany	 ﾠ
criticisms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠon	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcampuses;	 ﾠseldom,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcritics	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠway	 ﾠ“un-ﾭ‐Chinese.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
banner	 ﾠof	 ﾠpatriotism,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPropaganda	 ﾠDepartment’s	 ﾠhybrid	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠancient	 ﾠheritage	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
20
th	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠrevolutionary	 ﾠlegacy	 ﾠto	 ﾠfashion	 ﾠan	 ﾠallegedly	 ﾠseamless	 ﾠ“socialism	 ﾠwith	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
characteristics”	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠDeng	 ﾠXiaoping	 ﾠdubbed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐Mao	 ﾠsystem)	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠroot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠideology	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠimported	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠwholesale	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSoviet	 ﾠUnion,	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠ(at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠas	 ﾠHan	 ﾠChinese,	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot	 ﾠamong	 ﾠethnic	 ﾠminorities	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠTibetans	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
Uighurs)	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠachievement.	 ﾠ
STUDENT	 ﾠVOLUNTEERS	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠin	 ﾠeliciting	 ﾠcampus	 ﾠcompliance	 ﾠthan	 ﾠeither	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠor	 ﾠcultural	 ﾠ
governance,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsubmit,	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpanded	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvoluntarism	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
service	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠapace	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ–	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWenchuan	 ﾠEarthquake	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBeijing	 ﾠOlympics	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠStudent	 ﾠclubs	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠhad	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠa	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
college	 ﾠlife	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1980s.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠfew	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen	 ﾠa	 ﾠmushrooming	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
organizations	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠmission	 ﾠextends	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠcampus	 ﾠrecreational	 ﾠand	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
educational	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠservices	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacademy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠXi	 ﾠ
Jinping	 ﾠadministration	 ﾠhas	 ﾠblacklisted	 ﾠ“civil	 ﾠsociety”	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdangerous	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠnotion,	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
emergence	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠcampus	 ﾠcalm	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠPRC.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
space	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmeaningful	 ﾠparticipation	 ﾠafforded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrassroots	 ﾠNGOs	 ﾠencourages	 ﾠ
college	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprofessors)	 ﾠto	 ﾠconcentrate	 ﾠon	 ﾠvarieties	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
indirectly	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ–	 ﾠrelieving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠburden	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠchanneling	 ﾠyouthful	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠdisruptive	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Many	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassociations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsprung	 ﾠup	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠclose	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
party-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠ“mass	 ﾠassociations.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠYouth	 ﾠLeague	 ﾠ(CYL)	 ﾠ
plays	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠprominent	 ﾠrole	 ﾠon	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠcampuses,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠcamp	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠprospective	 ﾠparty	 ﾠmembers	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠas	 ﾠsponsor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠvolunteer	 ﾠand	 ﾠphilanthropic	 ﾠ
activities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠknown	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠCYL	 ﾠendeavors,	 ﾠProject	 ﾠHope,	 ﾠmobilizes	 ﾠa	 ﾠsteady	 ﾠstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
college	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠvolunteers	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠstaff	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthousands	 ﾠof	 ﾠelementary	 ﾠschools	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠ
constructed	 ﾠin	 ﾠimpoverished	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisproportionate	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠresources	 ﾠis	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
GONGOs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠgovernment-ﾭ‐organized	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐governmental	 ﾠorganizations,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠby	 ﾠno	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ
monopolize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfield	 ﾠof	 ﾠassociational	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠeither	 ﾠon	 ﾠor	 ﾠoff	 ﾠcampus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠAcademy	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Social	 ﾠSciences,	 ﾠa	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠthink	 ﾠtank,	 ﾠreported	 ﾠan	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠof	 ﾠover	 ﾠ800,000	 ﾠ“social	 ﾠ
organizations”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“social	 ﾠassociations”	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠ	 ﾠUnofficial	 ﾠestimates,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
multitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠunregistered	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠput	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrassroots	 ﾠNGOs	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
several	 ﾠmillion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThanks	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠreforms	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠit	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠservice	 ﾠorganizations	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
register	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠmunicipal	 ﾠbureaus	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠaffairs,	 ﾠgrassroots	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
enlarge	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfundraising	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠof	 ﾠlate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcatastrophic	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠWenchuan	 ﾠEarthquake,	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠboth	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠmedia	 ﾠencouraged	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠto	 ﾠdig	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠinto	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
pockets	 ﾠto	 ﾠaid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdisaster	 ﾠvictims,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠhas	 ﾠspread	 ﾠrapidly	 ﾠin	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠ
society.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCharitable	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠand	 ﾠphilanthropic	 ﾠventure	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠhave	 ﾠproliferated,	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
numbering	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthousands,	 ﾠand	 ﾠaffording	 ﾠever	 ﾠexpanding	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠ
activism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠWenchuan	 ﾠquake	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠencouraged	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrise	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠphilanthropy;	 ﾠit	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
triggered	 ﾠa	 ﾠmassive	 ﾠvolunteer	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠcitizens	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠ
especially	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠstudents,	 ﾠflocked	 ﾠto	 ﾠSichuan	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠassistance	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrescue	 ﾠ
effort.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠof	 ﾠyouthful	 ﾠvoluntarism	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠaccelerated	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠmonths	 ﾠlater	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ(via	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCYL,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠConfucius	 ﾠInstitute	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠagencies)	 ﾠ
mobilized	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠof	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠvolunteers	 ﾠto	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠout	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠBeijing	 ﾠOlympics.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
experiences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2008	 ﾠwere	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠtransformative	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠyoung	 ﾠChinese,	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠwent	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠcharities	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠand	 ﾠmany	 ﾠothers	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠof	 ﾠdevoting	 ﾠa	 ﾠgenerous	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠtime	 ﾠand	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
further	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠfavorite	 ﾠcauses.	 ﾠ7	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠbattling	 ﾠHIV/AIDS	 ﾠand	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠpollution	 ﾠanimated	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠgeneration	 ﾠof	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠ
grassroots	 ﾠNGO	 ﾠactivists,	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠissues	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmotives	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderlie	 ﾠthem	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
remarkably	 ﾠwide	 ﾠranging.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠfaiths	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠChristianity	 ﾠto	 ﾠBuddhism	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
inspiring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivately	 ﾠoperated	 ﾠmedical	 ﾠclinics	 ﾠand	 ﾠnursing	 ﾠhomes,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
example.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsecular	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠis	 ﾠfueling	 ﾠdonation	 ﾠdrives	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeverything	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
books	 ﾠfor	 ﾠschool	 ﾠlibraries	 ﾠto	 ﾠwinter	 ﾠcoats	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocialist	 ﾠideals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠdetected	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠNGOs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠand	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠservices	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
downtrodden	 ﾠworkers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠWORRIED	 ﾠSTATE	 ﾠ
Under	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠofficially	 ﾠespoused	 ﾠsocialist	 ﾠideology	 ﾠby	 ﾠupgrading	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
provision	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠis	 ﾠanxious	 ﾠto	 ﾠreap	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠdividends	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
fluorescence	 ﾠof	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠactivism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠeven	 ﾠcontract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcivic	 ﾠ
organizations	 ﾠto	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimplementation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmandated	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
services.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠtop	 ﾠpriority	 ﾠremains	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“stability	 ﾠmaintenance”	 ﾠ(weiwen),	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
perpetuation	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠparty	 ﾠrule.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFearful	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠactivists	 ﾠcould	 ﾠpose	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
existential	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠtranspired	 ﾠin	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1989,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠkeeps	 ﾠ
close	 ﾠtabs	 ﾠon	 ﾠNGOs	 ﾠand	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠit	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠ(through	 ﾠregistration	 ﾠrules	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsecurity	 ﾠ
surveillance	 ﾠand	 ﾠharassment)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlocal	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠto	 ﾠforge	 ﾠlinks	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcounterparts	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcountry.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠpays	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠconstraining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinvolvement	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
intellectuals	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠserving	 ﾠas	 ﾠbridges	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠoperating	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlocations	 ﾠor	 ﾠcomposed	 ﾠof	 ﾠdisparate	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠor	 ﾠinterests.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠobserver	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsuspect	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠauthorities	 ﾠof	 ﾠbetraying	 ﾠa	 ﾠstreak	 ﾠof	 ﾠparanoia	 ﾠin	 ﾠdevoting	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠto	 ﾠcombating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstudents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠ
rapid	 ﾠexpansion	 ﾠin	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠenrollments,	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpense	 ﾠof	 ﾠliberal	 ﾠarts	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrendered	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
China	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ–	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠsecuring	 ﾠa	 ﾠjob	 ﾠthan	 ﾠon	 ﾠsabotaging	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state’s	 ﾠworries	 ﾠare	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠgroundless.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
historic	 ﾠcycles	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠprotest,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠample	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
challenge	 ﾠposed	 ﾠby	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠpower	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠGreater	 ﾠChina	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠcampus	 ﾠcontrols	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠstringent	 ﾠthan	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmainland.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠkeenly	 ﾠappreciates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠacting	 ﾠas	 ﾠsparkplugs	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdisappear	 ﾠon	 ﾠJune	 ﾠFourth	 ﾠ1989.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTwenty-ﾭ‐five	 ﾠyears	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
suppression	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTiananmen	 ﾠUprising,	 ﾠevents	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠTaiwan	 ﾠand	 ﾠHong	 ﾠKong	 ﾠdemonstrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
continuing	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠ–	 ﾠin	 ﾠconcert	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠallies	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠtrigger	 ﾠmass	 ﾠ
movements	 ﾠwith	 ﾠunwelcome	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠBeijing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠTaiwan,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSunflower	 ﾠ
Student	 ﾠMovement	 ﾠ(taiyanghua	 ﾠxueyun)	 ﾠoccupied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠLegislative	 ﾠYuan	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠtime	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
history	 ﾠand	 ﾠforced	 ﾠthe	 ﾠruling	 ﾠparty	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconsider	 ﾠa	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐strait	 ﾠservice	 ﾠtrade	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ8	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
PRC.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠHong	 ﾠKong,	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠspearheaded	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠdemonstrations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠisland	 ﾠto	 ﾠregister	 ﾠdissatisfaction	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC’s	 ﾠstipulated	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnominating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcity’s	 ﾠ
chief	 ﾠexecutive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
It	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠeither	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠmovements,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
events	 ﾠin	 ﾠTaiwan	 ﾠand	 ﾠHong	 ﾠKong	 ﾠthis	 ﾠspring	 ﾠand	 ﾠsummer	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠauthorities’	 ﾠ
worries	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdangers	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠalliance	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpoliticized	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠactivists	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠawakened	 ﾠ
civil	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠresorting	 ﾠto	 ﾠcrackdowns	 ﾠby	 ﾠriot	 ﾠpolice,	 ﾠas	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠTaipei	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Hong	 ﾠKong,	 ﾠBeijing	 ﾠwould	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠfar	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠemergence	 ﾠof	 ﾠstudent-ﾭ‐inspired	 ﾠ
protest	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEnsuring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠcampuses	 ﾠare	 ﾠtightly	 ﾠmonitored	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
student	 ﾠenergies	 ﾠare	 ﾠchanneled	 ﾠinto	 ﾠsystem-ﾭ‐supportive	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsystem-ﾭ‐subversive	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠelement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregime’s	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“stability	 ﾠ
maintenance.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
THE	 ﾠUPPER	 ﾠHAND	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Like	 ﾠso	 ﾠmany	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠscene,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠwould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠconventional	 ﾠwisdom	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠsocioeconomic	 ﾠ
development	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCounter-ﾭ‐intuitively,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠof	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠassociational	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproven	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠhindrance	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
perpetuation	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠrule.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠa	 ﾠplatform	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
agitation	 ﾠand	 ﾠdemocratization,	 ﾠburgeoning	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠin	 ﾠmainland	 ﾠChina	 ﾠhas	 ﾠoffered	 ﾠan	 ﾠoutlet	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservice	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrelieves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠonerous	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠburden	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
fulfilling	 ﾠcitizens’	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠengagement.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpervasive	 ﾠcontestation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgates	 ﾠof	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠcampuses,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
sometimes	 ﾠsparked	 ﾠby	 ﾠgrassroots	 ﾠNGOs,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠon	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠand	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠ
issues	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠCCP	 ﾠauthority.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcampuses	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcradle	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠferment	 ﾠin	 ﾠ20
th	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠChina,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠremained	 ﾠuncharacteristically	 ﾠquiet	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast	 ﾠ
twenty-ﾭ‐five	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠrising	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
democratization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠJapan	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdisturbing,	 ﾠ
scenario	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠvociferous	 ﾠprotest	 ﾠand	 ﾠvibrant	 ﾠassociations	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1920s	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ‘30s	 ﾠpresaged	 ﾠa	 ﾠturn	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐wing	 ﾠmilitarism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBoth	 ﾠWeimar	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠTaisho	 ﾠ
Japan	 ﾠlacked	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠchannel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivism	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠaroused	 ﾠ
citizenry	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠliberalism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcases	 ﾠwas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdemocracy,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠfascism	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠscourge	 ﾠof	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠII.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ9	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠstark	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠinter-ﾭ‐war	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠJapan,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠtoday	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlack	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
strong	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠParty	 ﾠretains	 ﾠa	 ﾠtight	 ﾠgrip	 ﾠon	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠand	 ﾠsociety.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠturn	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠaggressive	 ﾠmilitarism	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeyond	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
realm	 ﾠof	 ﾠpossibility,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠtrajectory	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPRC	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontinued	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠParty	 ﾠ
rule.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdate,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state	 ﾠhas	 ﾠshown	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeft	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupper	 ﾠhand	 ﾠamidst	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
extraordinary	 ﾠexplosion	 ﾠof	 ﾠcitizen	 ﾠcontention.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠkey	 ﾠpillar	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevention	 ﾠof	 ﾠcampus	 ﾠunrest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThanks	 ﾠin	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
small	 ﾠpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠnew	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠvolunteerism	 ﾠafforded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdramatic	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠ
society,	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠare	 ﾠat	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdevoting	 ﾠmore	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠto	 ﾠcommunity	 ﾠservice	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠto	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠmobilization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHostile	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠleadership	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠ
society,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state’s	 ﾠsurvival	 ﾠhas	 ﾠactually	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠprolonged	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠemergence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Still	 ﾠone	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwonder:	 ﾠIf	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠauthoritarian	 ﾠpolity	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠresilient,	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠare	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
leaders	 ﾠso	 ﾠanxious	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem’s	 ﾠdurability?	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠcompelled	 ﾠto	 ﾠlavish	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
extravagant	 ﾠresources	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“stability	 ﾠmaintenance?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠJudging	 ﾠby	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠevents	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Taipei	 ﾠand	 ﾠHong	 ﾠKong,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecter	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠChinese	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠsociety	 ﾠ–	 ﾠaroused	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
impassioned	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠ–	 ﾠcould	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠpose	 ﾠa	 ﾠserious	 ﾠthreat	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠendurance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommunist	 ﾠparty-ﾭ‐state.	 ﾠ